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Refugee Law or Refugee Politics? The Varied Levels of China’s Hospitality 
Towards North Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese Refugees 
Kailey Ibsen 
有朋自远访来，不亦乐乎！ 
To have friends coming from afar, is it not a delight!
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 A landscape of rich flora, patterned by rice terraces stretching from Yunnan Province in 
the southwest of China into Myanmar’s northeast region, is home to an ethnic minority group, 
known as the “Kachin” in Myanmar and the “Jingpo” in China.2 Beginning in 2011, groups of 
Kachins, displaced from their villages due to war in the Kachin State of Myanmar, have fled to 
Yunnan Province, where the Chinese government has set up several camps for internationally 
displaced persons (IDPs).
 3
  However, some Kachins have been turned away by Chinese 
authorities at the border or ordered to leave villages where they were given shelter by Chinese 
nationals.
4
 To aid these displaced individuals, Mr. Zhang, a Chinese human rights activist, 
travels across the Myanmar-China border at unsecured, unpatrolled points to deliver food and 
supplies to the Kachin. His past efforts to raise awareness on human rights issues in China have 
led him into trouble with Chinese authorities.
5
 In 2003, Mr. Zhang was jailed for four months 
after writing about China’s persecution of house churches.6 However, as of February 2013, his 
subsequent humanitarian efforts along the border of Myanmar have been overlooked by Chinese 
                                                            
1 This is a famous Confucius quote. 
2 This paper will focus on the experience of Kachin people, who inhabit the Kachin State of Myanmar.  
3 Diantan & Yingjiang, The Kachin Dilemma, The Economist (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571189-over-border-kachin-conflict-causes-headaches-china-kachin-
dilemma.  
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 “House churches” in China are comprised of members who worship privately together in their homes. Only 
monitored and regulated state-sanctioned churches are allowed to openly operate in China. Zhaohui Hong, 
Protecting and Striving for the Rights to Religious Freedom: Case Studies on the Protestant House Churches in 
China, 29 J. of Third World Studies 1, 249-261 (2012).  
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authorities.
7
 Mr. Zhang’s experiences represent a familiar narrative of individuals who have 
come to the aid of refugees along the borders of China.
8
 This article will examine China’s 
response to three different refugee groups that have sought protection within its borders: North 
Koreans, Vietnamese, and Kachins. 
 For over twenty years, North Korean citizens have been crossing the border into China to 
escape famine and political, social, and religious persecution. Although China is a party to the 
United Nation’s 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 
(hereinafter “Refugee Convention”), its treatment of refugees that have fled into China from 
North Korea has been completely inconsistent with its obligations under this treaty.
 9
 China’s 
policy is to classify North Koreans escaping the deadly, oppressive rule of the North Korean 
regime as “economic migrants,” rather than “refugees,” and to completely repatriate North 
Koreans who illegally enter Chinese territory. 
10
 Collaborated efforts to secretly pass North 
Korean refugees through China into Southeast Asia have become known as the “new 
underground railroad.”11  Several Americans living in China have been caught aiding North 
Korean refugees and have been deported or sentenced to serve jail time in China.
12
 
Historically, China has not been so harsh in its dealings with all refugees that have 
arrived at its borders. In the 1970s, Vietnamese citizens fleeing war and ethnic discrimination 
arrived in China and nearly a quarter of a million people were offered refuge by the Chinese 
                                                            
7 DIANTAN, supra note 2.   
8 See generally, MELANIE KIRKPATRICK, ESCAPE FROM NORTH KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
ASIA’S UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (Encounter Books 2012). 
9 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, as amended 
by the 1967 New York Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78 [Refugee Convention]. 
10 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 147. 
11 Id. at 2.  
12 See id.  
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government.
 13
 In contrast to the experience of North Koreans in China, these Vietnamese 
refugees were not only welcomed and provided with food and temporary shelter, but the Chinese 
government even sent ships into the South China Sea to pick them up.
14
 Most of these people 
were Vietnamese citizens, but ethnically Chinese. Decades later, many Vietnamese refugees and 
their children continue to reside in China, primarily in Guangxi Province.
15
  
Officially, the Chinese government maintains that neither Kachins nor North Koreans in 
China are refugees, but rather North Koreans are illegal economic migrants, and Kachins are 
temporarily displaced people visiting family and friends in Yunnan.
16
 However, it is evident that 
China has been more accommodating to Kachin refugees than it has been to North Korean 
refugees, despite the stronger case for granting refugee status to individuals fleeing North Korea 
under the Refugee Convention. While China has not practiced a policy of total repatriation of 
Kachin people, there have been reports of arbitrary repatriation or denied entry of Kachins into 
China. Additionally, China has taken a much stronger hand in prosecuting those who aid North 
Koreans in China under its domestic penal law. On the other hand, Vietnamese refugees that fled 
to China in the late 1970s were granted asylum.
17
 Despite the current disparity in treatment of 
North Koreans and Kachins, neither group has experienced the welcome and long-term stay 
offered to Vietnamese refugees several decades ago.  
Examining China’s approach to North Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese refugees against 
one another, begins to suggest that China will interpret its obligations under international treaties 
                                                            
13 Tom Lam, The Exodus of Hoa Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China’s Refugee 
Settlement Strategies, 13 J. of Refugee Studies 4, 374-390 (2000). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 147. ‘No Assistance’ for Kachin Refugees, Radio Free Asia (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/burma/refugees-06262012165817.html. 
17 Xiaorong Han, Exiled to the Ancestral Land: The Resettlement Stratification and Assimilation of the Refugees 
from Vietnam in China, 10 Int’l. J. of Asian Studies 1, 25-46 (Jan. 2013), at 28. 
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depending on what horse it has in the race. Vietnamese refugees that were subject to ethnic 
discrimination and persecution in Vietnam were most likely properly granted asylum in China, 
even though China was not yet a signatory party to the Refugee Convention at that time. North 
Koreans fleeing into China have a strong case for refugee status under the Refugee Convention 
and warranting protection under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “Torture Convention”).18 Human rights groups 
have argued that Kachin people in Yunnan Province, China fulfill the U.N.’s definition of 
refugee.
19
 However, the circumstances surrounding the Kachin dilemma do not provide as 
compelling a case for refugee status as does the plight of North Koreans in China. The Chinese 
government has nevertheless departed from its practice of complete repatriation and has 
established four temporary camps for Kachins in Yunnan Province, though not all Kachins are 
granted refuge in the camps, as some have been denied refuge in China and transported by bus 
back into Myanmar.
20
 There have not been any reports suggesting what criteria local authorities 
have used in Yunnan Province, when determining which refugees should be denied entry to 
China or forcibly returned to Myanmar. The national government in Beijing has not taken a 
substantial amount of direct involvement in the situation and enforcement by local officials 
appears to be arbitrary.
21
 Even so, the Kachin people and the Chinese activists providing aid to 
them have received different treatment than North Korean refugees and their supporters. 
Although many Chinese people have provided shelter to undocumented Kachins and 
                                                            
18 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, 10 Dec. 
1984. 
19 ISOLATED IN YUNNAN: KACHIN REFUGEES FROM BURMA IN CHINA’S YUNNAN PROVINCE 25 
(Human Rights Watch June 2012), available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/06/25/isolated-yunnan. 
20 Kachin refugees from Myanmar face food and water shortages at makeshift camps in China, UNHCR Refugees 
Daily (June 27, 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4febee2a5. Kate 
Hodal, Burma steps up military offensive against Kachin rebels, The Guardian (Jan. 01, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/14/burma-military-offensive-kachin-rebels. 
21 David Cohen, China’s Myanmar Problem, The Diplomat (Jan. 17, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/china-
power/chinas-myanmar-problem/. 
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humanitarian workers have illegally crossed the border to bring Kachin people supplies, there 
have not been any reports of detention of these individuals by Chinese authorities.  
This paper will present the historic background and current relevant factors of North 
Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese refugees in China, followed by an analysis of economic and 
political interests that likely account for China’s differing treatment of each refugee situation. 
Part one will discuss the plight that ordinary people face in North Korea, China’s strict 
repatriation policy towards North Korean refugees, and a secret network of aid workers that help 
them to pass through China to safety. Part two will explore the background of refugees that 
entered into Southern China from Vietnam in the mid to late 1970s and the Chinese 
government’s active role in aiding them. In part three, this paper will examine the current 
conflict in the Kachin State of Myanmar, ethnic Kachin people that have fled to Yunnan 
Province, China, and the treatment of Chinese nationals that have been providing them with food 
and shelter.  
After exploring the circumstances of each region, part four will discuss China’s current 
political and economic interests in North Korea and Myanmar and hypothesis as to the reasons 
why Vietnamese refugees received such a distinctly warmer welcome in China. It is the opinion 
of this paper that the Chinese ethnicity of the Vietnamese refugees that arrived in China in the 
1970s, as well as the deteriorating relations between China and Vietnam at that time, were major 
factors in the accommodating treatment they received from the Chinese government. China’s 
differing treatment of North Korean refugees and ethnic Kachins may be explained, in part, by 
the influential role that the Kachin Independence Organization plays in the security of Chinese 
investments in the Kachin State and the fact that the average North Korean citizen exercises little 
to no clout in Chinese government policy decisions. In order to protect its economic interests in 
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Myanmar, it is pragmatic for China to encourage peace in the Kachin State of Myanmar and 
remain somewhat neutral between the Kachin people and the Myanmar government, due to the 
power that the Kachin still maintain in a region where China has made many investments. As 
North Korea’s only ally, Beijing prioritizes preserving friendly relations with the North Korean 
regime. Therefore, complying with its agreement with the North Korean government to repatriate 
“defectors” is important in order to maintain stability on the North Korea-China border.  
Finally, part five of this paper will make recommendations for China’s future course of 
action with refugees from North Korea and Myanmar. While China’s differing approaches in the 
two regions may serve its economic and geopolitical interests, they are contrary to the requests 
and mandates of the United Nations and have resulted in uneven enforcement of China’s 
domestic law. It is the opinion of this paper that in order to meet its international legal 
obligations, China must end its repatriation policy of North Korean refugees and comply with the 
United Nation’s request to grant Kachin people temporary legal status in China, until they are 
able to return to their homes. However, while it is plausible that China may accordingly 
accommodate Kachin refugees, it is strongly unlikely that there will be any modification to 
China’s repatriation policy of North Korean refugees without significant pressure from the 
international community. Imposing heavy pressure on China may not be a current priority of the 
international community, given the greater danger posed by the North Korean government’s 
nuclear program and increasingly aggressive posture. If China were to decide to grant asylum to 
North Koreans, its experience with Vietnamese refugees would serve as a useful model for how 
to deal with a refugee population.  
Part I: Fleeing North Korea 
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After World War II, political differences divided the Korean Peninsula and leader Kim Il 
Sung built a communist nation in the north based on the Soviet model.
22
 The new North Korea 
was supported by China and the Soviet Union.
23
 Yet after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev, who 
opposed Stalinism and warned against cult personalities like Kim Il Sung, came to power.
24
 The 
changing political climate in the Soviet Union prompted Kim Il Sung to purge all who opposed 
his rule from the Communist Party.
25
 Although North Korea initially experienced a period of 
economic success, the economy eventually stalled and the country became largely supported by 
subsidized supplies from the Soviet Union.
26
 Crisis set in when the Soviet Union collapsed and 
famine struck North Korea.
27
  After the fall of the Soviet Union, China remained North Korea’s 
only ally.
28
 The death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, followed by a series of natural disasters, further 
exacerbated the food shortage and many starving North Koreans began to flee into China.
29
 
During this time, approximately 5% percent of the population died.
30
  
Today, severe food rationing, hunger, and numerous human rights violations persist in 
North Korea. The government has devised a discriminatory food policy to deal with the food 
shortage, which allocates food rations on the basis of social standing.
31
 The country’s regions are 
organized by social castes and rations are distributed accordingly.
32
 When food rations are 
particularly scarce, the region in the northwest, which is inhabited by one of the lowest ranking 
                                                            
22 GLYN FORD, NORTH KOREA ON THE BRINK: STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 2 (Pluto Press 2007). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 113. 
27 Id.  
28 James Seymour, China and the International Asylum Regime: The Case of the North Korean Refugees, East Asian 
Institute, Columbia University 1-9 (2000). 
29 Id.  
30 MARC NOLAND, WITNESS TO TRANSFORMATION: REFUGEE INSIGHTS INTO NORTH KOREA 1 
(Peterson Institute for International Economics 2011).  
31 Richard Parks, Shining a Light on North Korea’s Human Rights Crisis, The Diplomat (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/12/12/shinning-a-light-on-north-koreas-human-rights-crisis/. 
32 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 25.  
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social castes, is sometimes denied rations entirely.
33
 The caste system also determines whether 
an individual can attend university and what type of job they can obtain.
34
 In depth academic 
scholarship on the plight of North Korean refugees is scare, due to the country’s isolation, and 
most published information about refugees that have escaped comes from media and government 
sources.
35
 Stories of the North Korean government’s abuse of its citizens have been provided to 
the international community from refugees that have successfully escaped to Southeast Asia, 
South Korea, or western countries.  Not all refugees are willing to tell their story, for fear that 
their families in North Korea will be punished, but those that do share their stories provide 
crucial information to understanding this out-migration.
36
 Many people in North Korea, 
including political dissents, are arbitrarily imprisoned in harsh conditions.
37
 These circumstances, 
along with many other injustices, have caused North Koreans to flee to China, where they hope 
to find food and some relief.  
When North Koreans first flee their country, they enter China through Jilin Province in 
the northeast of China, a region referred to in Mandarin as “Dongbei.”38 Jilin Province has a 
large population of ethnic Koreans, who are Chinese nationals. North Korean citizens in Jilin 
Province are individuals connected with and trusted by the North Korean government or refugees 
that are hiding from authorities, passing through China, or sold as brides to Chinese men.  A 
group of these government supported individuals attends Northeast Normal University in 
                                                            
33 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 148. 
34 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 25. 
35 Elim Chan and Andreas Schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law, 19 Int’l. J. on 
Refugee Law 2, 215-245 (2007). 
36 Id. 
37 PARKS, supra note 30.  
38 A direct translation of “Dongbei” in Mandarin Chinese is eastnorth. Cardinal directions in Mandarin are described 
in the reverse order of directions in English.   
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Changchun, a large city in Jilin Province.
39
 Besides their North Korean citizenship, other 
information about their identities is unknown to most, if not all, students and they generally 
travel together in public and avoid social interaction with other students. Other than the 
individuals who receive permission from the North Korean government to travel to China, most 
North Koreans in Jilin Province do not have legal status in China and are considered to be 
“defectors” by the North Korean government.40  The worst outcome for those fleeing North 
Korea is to become discovered by Chinese authorities and sent back to North Korea. As a result 
of China’s strict repatriation policy, many North Korean refugees that do not continue on to a 
third country are pushed underground.
41
 This leaves them vulnerable to blackmail, abuse, and 
sexual exploitation.
42
 North Korean women are also vulnerable to the dangers of the illegal bride 
market in China. Due to a gender imbalance, human trafficking of women as “brides” has 
become a serious problem in China.
43
 Sadly, a market for North Korean “brides” endures, in part, 
by the fact that their families will probably never come looking for them and the women 
themselves may fear deportation to North Korea more than remaining with their captors.  
Refugees that are successful in passing through China into Southeast Asia often do so 
with the help of a disjointed network of humanitarian workers, collectively known as the 
“underground railroad.”44  This network is partly comprised of American and South Korean 
                                                            
39 This information is based on personal encounters, while living in Jilin Province, China and attending Northeast 
Normal University as a Chinese language student.  
40 SEYMOUR, supra note 28. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 The gender imbalance of the Chinese population consists of a disproportionate number of men to women. The 
most popular theory on the cause of this imbalance is China’s One Child Policy and the desire of couples, based on 
traditional Chinese values and economic concerns, to have a son. In some Chinese cities, both the desire to have a 
son and the restrictions of the One Child policy are relaxing, but the policy has resulted in a serious shortage of 
prospective brides for many young Chinese men now coming of age. Richard Lehmann, Why China is Finally 
Abandoning its One Child Policy, Forbes (March 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2013/03/28/why-
china-is-finally-abandoning-its-one-child-policy. 
44 See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7. 
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based NGOs, as well as Chinese churches that provide shelter to North Korean refugees, arrange 
transportation to their next destination, and connect them with individuals who can help them in 
the next segment of their journeys.
45
 Many refugees that successfully pass through China report 
that they were told early in their journey to “look for a building with a cross on it.”46 After 
connecting with this network in Jilin Province, successful refugees often make their way to 
Kunming, a city in the southwest province of Yunnan. From there, a typical journey continues 
into Laos and across the Mekong River to Thailand. Once in Thailand, North Korean refugees 
often go to the South Korean Embassy or the U.S. Embassy to seek political asylum. While this 
is the typical experience of successful refugees, many people that flee North Korea are not as 
lucky.  
Protecting North Koreans under UN Conventions 
China has not fulfilled its obligations as a signatory party to international treaties that set 
out to protect the rights and safety of endangered people, such as those fleeing from North Korea 
to China. China has been a party to the Refugee Convention since 1982. Under the Refugee 
Convention, a refugee is defined as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country.” 47  Parties agree to a policy of ‘non-refoulement,’ under which a state is 
prohibited from forcibly returning refugees if their “life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political 
                                                            
45 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 40.  
46 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 41. 
47 REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 9, at art. 33.  
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opinion.”48 This policy of non-refoulment requires states to provide “access to fair and effective 
procedures for determining status and protection needs” before rejecting asylum seekers at the 
nation’s border.49  
Another treaty that China has violated in its treatment of North Korean refugees is the 
Convention against Torture (hereinafter “Torture Convention”), which China ratified in 1988. It 
undertakes to prevent torture and inhumane treatment of people around the world.
50
 Article 3 of 
the Torture Convention prevents signatory parties from returning or extraditing a person to a 
state in which there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be in danger 
of being tortured.
51
 Torture is defined in Article 1 as: 
Any act by which severe pain, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It 
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.
52
 
Additionally, Article 10 of the Torture Convention requires signatory governments to provide 
training on the prohibition of torture to all levels of law enforcement.
53
 Although these treaties 
require signatory nations to take appropriate measures to protect human rights, China’s 
                                                            
48 Id. at art. 33.  
49 UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, UNHCR (November 1997), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/438c6d972.html. 
50 PETER BURNS, CHINA AND THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 3 (Int'l Ctr. for Criminal Law Reform & Criminal 
Justice Policy 2005). 
51 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, 10 
December 1984. 
52 Id. art. 1. 
53 Id. art 10. 
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constitution is silent on the domestic implementation of international treaties.
54
 The Chinese 
government did, however, state in a 1991 report that as soon as the government agrees to an 
international treaty, it becomes effective in China and that the Torture Convention is effective in 
China.
55
 Despite this comment, China’s agreement with North Korea to repatriate any North 
Korean, is clearly not in conformity with China’s obligations under the treaty, as North Koreans 
face grave danger when returning to North Korea. Besides this agreement, Chinese domestic law 
does not expressly call for deportation of all refugees, and even if it were to, China’s Civil 
Procedure Law provides that when there is a conflict between an international treaty and Chinese 
Law, the international treaty will govern, besides where China has expressly declared 
reservations.
56
 Although China has made no such declarations of reservation in regard to Articles 
1 or 3 of the Torture Convention, its repatriation of undocumented North Koreans is clearly a 
violation of these articles.  
There are several valid legal grounds for finding that returning North Koreans to their 
home country would violate the Torture Convention and for granting North Koreans in China 
with refugee status under the UN’s definition. These include the North Korean government’s 
persecution of any religious beliefs, severe suppression of speech, arbitrary imprisonment and 
torture of political dissidents, the organization of citizens into social castes, discriminatory 
distribution of food rations, and the persecution of any citizen that leaves the country.
57
 Despite 
these circumstances, China does not recognize any undocumented North Koreans as refugees 
and follows a strict policy of repatriation of these undocumented individuals. China’s policy of 
                                                            
54 Sanzhuan Guo, Implementation of Human Rights Treaties by Chinese Courts: Problems and Prospects, 8 Chinese 
J. of Int’l Law 1 (2009) 161-179. 
55 Id. 
56 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 260, 31 Aug. 2012.  
57 ROBERTA COHEN, CHINA’S REPATRIATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 2-3 (Brookings Institute 
2012).  
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repatriation of North Koreans began in the 1960s, but an influx of North Koreans into China did 
not become a real problem until the Chinese economy took off in the mid-1990s and severe 
famine struck North Korea.
58
 Interestingly, before this time, most migrants into Northeast China 
were well-nourished males.
59
 Although an agreement between China and North Korea had 
already been made to return those that illegally crossed over the border, China did not make 
strong enforcement efforts against these early migrants.
60
 This may be because the amount of 
migrants was small enough that the Chinese government did not receive the same level of 
pressure from the North Korean government or because China was not as concerned about a 
North Korean population in Northeast China until the influx became more significant. In fact, 
until recently, Chinese domestic law did not even provide a formal definition of a refugee. In 
2012, China’s Exit-Entry Law was revised to include recognition of refugee status in Article 46, 
stating that, 
Foreign nationals applying for a refugee status, during the period of 
identification of their refugee status, stay in China on the basis of a temporary 
identification issued by the public security authority; and those identified as 
refugees may stay or reside in China on the basis of a refugee identification issued 
by the public security authority.
61
 
China has defended against accusations that it has violated its obligations to receive 
North Korean refugees by asserting that individuals who have illegally crossed into China from 
North Korea are not in fact “refugees,” but rather “economic migrants.”62 This categorization 
grossly minimizes the human rights violations by the North Korean regime against the North 
Korean people. The Chinese government has argued that its repatriation of undocumented North 
                                                            
58 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 28. (Before the early 1990s, there was not a huge incentive for North Koreans to 
risk their lives fleeing to China because the standard of living in China was not significantly greater than in North 
Korea.)  
59 SEYMOUR, supra note 28. 
60 Id. 
61 Exit-Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 46, 30 June 2012.  
62 Melanie Kirkpatrick, China Vs. North Korea’s Refugees, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 2013 at A. 15. 
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Koreans is analogous to the United States’ deportation of illegal immigrants from Mexico.63 
However, among the many distinguishing factors between undocumented North Koreans in 
China and undocumented Mexicans in the United States is that upon returning to North Korea, 
citizens would be criminally charged for fleeing.
64
 In 2010, the North Korean Ministry of Public 
Security issued a decree calling defection a crime of treachery.
65
 Any crime of an individual in 
North Korean is payable by three generations of the criminal’s family.66 The punishment is based 
on a theory of ‘collective responsibility’ and sets out to ‘cleanse’ North Korea of its opponents. 
The approach is suspected to have its roots in a statement made in 1972 by Kim Il Sung that, 
“Factionalists or enemies of class, whoever they are, their seed must be eliminated through three 
generations.”67 Another counterpoint to China’s “economic migrant” defense is that the United 
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (hereinafter “UNHCR”) provides that where a 
country’s economic measures result in the destruction of a population’s economic existence, the 
victims may become refugees upon leaving their country.
68
 
 Additionally, a strong argument can be made that China’s repatriation policy of North 
Koreans violates the Torture Convention. Under the Torture Convention, signatory states are 
prohibited from returning individuals to a country where there are substantial ground for 
believing that the individual will be inflicted with severe physical or mental pain for the purpose 
of punishing him for an act he has committed.
69
 It is well documented that individuals repatriated 
                                                            
63 Id. 
64 COHEN, supra note 44, at 2. 
65 Id.  
66 KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 3. 
67 CHAN, supra note 27, at 219.  
68 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees F.63, 1976. 
69 TORTURE CONVENTION, supra note 47.  
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back to North Korea are punished by death or placed into labor camps.
70
 One such refugee, who 
now lives in the United States, spoke at a conference in Washington, D.C. and described his time 
in a North Korean prison.
71
 He said that one morning an inmate was too weak to get out of bed 
after he was beaten all night by the prison guards. His fellow inmates were ordered to bury him 
alive in the woods.
72
 
Helping North Koreans 
Although the Chinese government formally stated on December 1, 1995 that, “UNHCR 
personnel may at all times have unimpeded access to refugees and to the sites of UNHCR 
projects in order to monitor all phases of their implementation,” the UNHCR has not been able to 
do so in the case of North Korean refugees.
73
 International aid groups have also been denied 
access to monitor the situation near the North Korean border.
74
 In 2006, a report from Time 
Magazine suggested Chinese authorities had increased their efforts in northeast cities to break up 
networks that seek to aid North Koreans in passing through China or providing them with 
shelter.
75
 Generally, small gestures of providing food to undocumented North Koreans are 
ignored by local Chinese authorities, but any involvement in aiding North Koreans to pass 
through China via the “underground railroad” is a serious criminal offense.76 The New York 
Times has described a trend of “gradually hardening Chinese posture" toward those who aid 
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North Koreans.
77
 This increased enforcement might be due, in part, to the occurrence of North 
Korean soldiers fleeing into China.
78
  
In December 2006, three Americans were arrested by Chinese authorities, for helping 
North Korean refugees to reach the United States Consulate in Shenyang, a large city in Jilin 
Province.
79
 They worked for an organization called LiNK, which set out to help North Korean 
refugees pass through the “underground railroad” to freedom and safety.80 One of the three 
arrested was the group’s executive director, Adrian Hong, who had previously aided in the 
escape of the first North Koreans to receive political asylum in the United States.
81
 A few days 
before the group was arrested, they executed the beginning of a plan to bring six North Koreans, 
who had been hiding in the Chinese border town of Yanji, to the American Consulate.
82
 This was 
the same way Hong had successfully aided two North Koreans escape a few months earlier and 
he was confident that a Foreign Service officer at the Consulate would help him to do so again.
83
 
Yet while strategically positioned in a KFC restaurant in Shenyang, just down the street from the 
U.S. Consulate, the plan began to unravel.
84
 The group’s cover was blown when Hong called the 
Consulate, speaking with intentionally vague language, and a Foreign Service officer replied in 
specific detail that he should instead bring the North Koreans to UNHCR in Beijing.
85
 Hong and 
the other two Americans were arrested by Chinese authorities, who heard the conversation 
through their electronic surveillance.
86
 They were transported to a jail in Beijing, where they 
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were held for a week before being deported to the United States.
87
 The three LiNK employees 
were lucky because they could have served many years in Chinese prison under Article 318 of 
China’s Criminal Law. Article 318 criminalizes the act of assisting a person to illegally cross the 
national borders of China.
88
 Aiding one individual holds a sentence of two to seven years, but 
additional circumstances, such as acting as a ringleader or repeating the offense, yield sentences 
from seven years to life in prison.
89
 Adrian Hong was particularly lucky, as he repeatedly acted 
as a ringleader to bring North Koreans to the U.S. Consulate. Fortunately for Hong, it appears 
that his earlier actions of aiding North Koreans went undiscovered by Chinese authorities at the 
time of his deportation. 
Other individuals that have aided North Korean individuals in China, including Steven 
Kim, a Korean-American businessman, have not been as lucky as the LiNK employees. Steven 
Kim left his work in the United States, when he felt a spiritual calling to go to China and assist 
refugees fleeing from the severe North Korean regime.
90
 After being arrested in connection with 
helping North Koreans to pass through China on the “underground railroad,” Kim was convicted 
under Article 318 and served five years in a Chinese prison.
91
 After serving out his sentence, he 
returned to New York, where he now operates an organization called 318 Partners, named after 
the Chinese Law upon which he was prosecuted, to help raise awareness on the situation of 
North Korean refugees.
92
  
Part III: Vietnamese in China 
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In the late 1970sChina granted asylum to approximately 270,000 Vietnamese citizens 
fleeing war and ethnic discrimination.
93
 When U.S. forces moved out of Vietnam after the 
Vietnam War, the new Vietnamese government began confiscating businesses and moving 
people from urban areas to farmland.
94
 Much of this weight fell on the ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam.
95
 In 1978, sensing the danger of an open conflict between the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese and feeling discriminated against, many Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity began to 
flee to China.
96
 Many became fishers, farmers, and factory works and still reside in China.
97
 The 
Vietnamese refugees were predominantly from the Han ethnic group, which makes up the 
majority of China’s population.98 In China, the names used to describe these refugees, such as 
Yuenan huaqiao (meaning “overseas Chinese from Vietnam”), illustrate how they are almost as 
belonging in China.
99
 The name suggests the notion that, although they were Vietnamese citizens, 
the refugees were previously like ex-patriots of China living in Vietnam that have returned home. 
Some Vietnamese left for China voluntarily and others were pushed out by the Vietnamese 
government.
100
 They became famously known around the world as the “boat people” noting their 
typical mode of transportation across the South China Sea to the coast of China. Once in China, 
the refugees lived in refugee camps only for a short period of time and were quickly brought to 
new homes and offered permanent status.
101
 Most of the Vietnamese refugees were brought to 
live on state-farms in rural Guangxi Province.
102
 Within a few years of arrival, groups of 
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refugees developed successful businesses in the city of Beihai in Guangxi Province, many with 
export contracts to Hong Kong.
103
 In the mid-1980s, it was reported that many of those that 
became business people, as well as those who worked as farmers in the rural areas, earned 
salaries of $4,000 USD per year, which was higher than the average Chinese salary at that 
time.
104
  
However, other reports published in the late-1980s did not paint as flowery a picture of 
life for Vietnamese refugees in China. In 1987, the Associate Press reported that Chinese 
authorities had stopped more than 4,000 Vietnamese refugees from leaving China and called the 
need to stop the flow of Vietnamese refugees out of China “a matter of the utmost 
importance.”105 Refugees leaving China complained that the quality of their farmland was poor 
and that it was difficult to find better paying jobs.
106
 It might be the case that these particular 
refugees never intended to stay in China and viewed it as an intermediate destination from which 
they would continue on to a third country, such as Hong Kong or a western nation. Nevertheless, 
the experience of Vietnamese refugees in China was arguably successful. In March 2006, 
UNHCR Commissioner Antonio Guterres called the integration of Vietnamese refugees into 
Chinese society “one of the most successful integration programs in the world.”107 Although 
these refugees that have now resided in China for several decades still do not have full Chinese 
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citizenship, they do enjoy much of the same benefits as Chinese citizens and are sometimes even 
issued Chinese passports by local authorities.
108
 
Part III: The Kachin Conflict 
To consider the reasons behind and implications of China’s treatment of ethnic Kachin 
people in Yunnan Province, it is important to understand the background of the current conflict 
in the Kachin State of Myanmar. Myanmar is a country located in Southeast Asia, which borders 
China, India, Thailand, and Laos. The country was governed under British rule for 62 years, as a 
part of the Indian Empire and then as a separate colony, until it became a sovereign nation in 
1948.
109
 Today, sixty eight percent of people in Myanmar belong to the Burman ethnic group, 
but the country has many different ethnic minorities, including the Kachin.
110
 The Kachin people 
live in the northeast Kachin State of Myanmar, one of the country’s seven states. In 1947, the 
Kachin minority group, together with other ethnic groups in Myanmar entered into the Panglong 
Agreement with the Myanmar government, which promised ethnic Kachins a semi-autonomous 
Kachin State in northwestern Myanmar.
111
 However, this promise never materialized, which led 
to the original conflict between the national government and the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO), together with its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
112
 The 
fight continued until a ceasefire agreement was reached in 1994.
113
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In 2012, reforms to Myanmar’s government prompted the U.S. and other nations to lift 
economic sanctions against the country, but freedom of expression continues to be highly 
restricted.
114
 In Myanmar’s recent elections, the Kachin people were not able to form a political 
party.
115
 After a 17-year-long truce between the Myanmar Army and the KIA, fighting resumed 
in 2011.
116
 Some reports have attributed the recent conflict to tensions caused by Chinese 
investments in the region, including a large dam project that displaced over 12,000 ethnic 
Kachins, who were forcibly relocated to Chinese-built villages.
117
 Other reports have claimed 
that the breakdown of the agreement occurred after the government pressed the KIA to merge 
with the national army or to disarm.
118
 However, representatives of the KIA have claimed the 
resumed fighting is in response to war crimes committed against civilian Kachins and the 
continued oppression of the Kachin people.
119
 Although Myanmar President Thein Sein said the 
national army would only act in self-defense, jet fighters were sighted targeting the KIA in early 
2012 and the Myanmar Army has reportedly been moving toward the KIA headquarters in Laiza, 
a town near the Chinese border.
120
 There have also been reports of KIA attacks on non-military 
targets, including passenger trains.
121
 Similar claims against the national army have been made 
by an organization called Free Burma Rangers, based in Chiangmai, Thailand, which posted a 
video of national helicopters shooting into a KIA area.
122
 President Thein Sein’s office defended 
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the strike by stating that the KIA had attacked government convoys in that area.
123
 Since the 
ceasefire between the KIA and the national Burmese Army ended in 2011, over sixty villages 
that were previously inhabited by ethnic Kachins have been burned.
124
 Peace talks between the 
Myanmar government and the KIA were facilitated by the Chinese in early 2013, but the most 
recent meeting on March 10, 2013 resulted only in an agreement to proceed with further 
negotiations of a ceasefire.
125
 Although aid workers in Myanmar have reported a lessening 
appearance of violent conflict, it is unclear when a ceasefire will be reached.
126
 The KIA 
demands political dialogue before agreeing to a ceasefire and the Myanmar Army demands a 
ceasefire as a precursor to any political conversations.
127
 
Protecting Kachins  
Displaced Kachins began fleeing to China in June 2011.
128
 Some crossed the border at 
unsecured points, which is typical in daily economic activities on the border.
129
 Many of these 
people went to stay with friends, relatives, and other Chinese nationals who graciously provided 
them with shelter. Human Rights Watch issued a report in June 2012 stating that Chinese 
authorities had forcibly returned Kachins in Yunnan Province back to Myanmar, but the report 
also stated that the Chinese government made concerted efforts to collect information about the 
displaced Kachins and their needs.
130
 Although there are probably many Chinese people that 
have sheltered displaced Kachins, who illegally crossed the border, there have been no reports of 
arrests or detention of these individuals. Theoretically, anyone helping a Kachin residing 
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illegally in China could be prosecuted under Article 318 of China’s Criminal Law. There have 
also been no reports of arrests of individuals like Mr. Zhang, who illegally cross the border at 
unsecured points to help bring supplies to Kachin people. Chinese authorities appear to be 
unconcerned with these humanitarian efforts, or at least unaware, due to the lower priority the 
issue holds or the newness of the situation. 
While the Chinese government has not formally granted Kachin people, who have fled 
Myanmar into China, refugee status, the establishment of refugee camps in Yunnan Province 
indicates a stark departure from its approach to North Koreans entering into China through the 
northeastern border. Conditions of these camps have been criticized by Human Rights Watch, 
but no formal investigation by the UNHCR has been conducted. The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson Hong Lei expressed the Chinese government’s view on the 
displaced Kachins in Yunnan Province stating: 
Since early this year, there have been military conflicts between Myanmar’s 
military government and armed ethnic groups. Some of the [Burmese] have come 
to China because of safety issues. They are not refugees. Moreover, they will 
return to Myanmar as soon as the conflicts end. China has been providing 
humanitarian aid to those people during their time in China.
131
 
Human Rights Watch argued in favor of refugee status for these displaced Kachins in Yunnan, 
stating that they fled human rights violations in Myanmar and returning to their homes would be 
life threatening.
132
 UNHCR has not made any determination of their status, but has petitioned 
China to grant Kachins temporary legal status in Yunnan. It is difficult for UNHCR to make a 
full assessment of the situation because it currently lacks access to the camps in Yunnan, because 
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China does not allow any foreign aid or media groups to provide coverage of the Kachin 
refugees.
133
 On September 7, 2012, UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards stated that: 
Despite repeated requests to the Chinese authorities, UNHCR has not been able to 
reach or assist these groups living along the Chinese side of the border. In mid-
August this year, we started receiving reports of Kachins being sent back to 
Myanmar, but were unable to confirm as we could not access the border areas.
134
  
UNHCR has not been able to investigate the camps set up in China, but it was able to travel to 
the village of Lwe Je in the Kachin State of Myanmar, near the Chinese border.
135
 In Lwe Je, 
UNHCR reported stories from Kachin people that plain-clothed police officers removed them 
from their shelters in China, loaded their belongings into trucks, and transported them back to 
Myanmar. These returnees are now living in temporary camps in the Kachin State, as they fear 
returning to their villages.
136
  
To build a case for Kachin refugee status under the Refugee Convention, an argument 
could be made on the basis of persecution of an ethnic minority group or as war refugees. The 
Refugee Convention provides for the protection of individuals that are persecuted due to their 
race, nationality, or social status. Evidence of the Myanmar government’s persecution of the 
Kachin can be found its long history of depriving the Kachin people of representation in the 
government, freedom to express their political opinions, broken promises of autonomy, and 
targeting ethnic Kachins with crimes of abduction, rape, and murder. Individuals fleeing war are 
not generally granted refugee status unless they can demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
persecution and an inability or unwillingness (as a product of their fear) to avail themselves of 
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the protection of the government in their home country.
137
 Here, due to the fact that the 
persecution of Kachins and crimes against Kachin people are being committed by the national 
army, it is easy to argue that the Kachin are unable to gain necessary protection. Rape against 
ethnic minority women in Myanmar was confirmed generally by pro-democracy leader Aung 
San Suu Ki, who stated in 2011 that: 
Rape is used in my country as a weapon against those who only want to live in 
peace, who only want to assert their basic human rights. It is used as a weapon by 
armed forces to intimidate the ethnic nationalities and to divide our country.
138
 
The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand reported that from September 2012 to February 
2013, twenty-six civilian Kachins had been injured or killed by artillery attacks by the Myanmar 
Army.
139
 They also documented the rape of 64 women and girls by national troops.
140
 Another 
non-profit organization, the Shan Women’s Action Network, which represents the interests of 
women from Myanmar’s Shan ethnic minority has also reported numerous instances of rape by 
members of Myanmar’s army.141 
 If the UN made a determination that Kachins in China meet the Refugee Convention’s 
definition of a refugee, China, as a signatory party, would be obligated to accept Kachin refugees 
and would be prohibited from returning Kachin people to the region in which their lives are 
threatened. However, the UN has not made that determination and has instead petitioned China 
to grant Kachins in Yunnan temporary legal status and allow them to stay until conditions are 
safe enough to return to their homes in Myanmar. The request that China provide only temporary 
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status to Kachins rather than permanent asylum might be due to an unofficial determination by 
UNHCR that Kachins do not meet the criteria of refugee status or because they believe the 
fighting in their villages will not continue long-term. Whether China’s deportation of Kachins in 
Yunnan would establish a violation of the Torture Convention depends on a finding of 
substantial grounds for believing that returned Kachins could be tortured in Myanmar. Although 
returned Kachins continue to be displaced from their villages and live in overcrowded ICP camps, 
their conditions probably do not meet the UN’s definition of torture. Based on this definition and 
the observation of UNHCR representatives in Myanmar’s IDP camps, China is probably not 
violating the Torture Convention by returning Kachins to Myanmar, though it could still be 
found to be in violation of their obligations to accept Kachins under the Refugee Convention.  
Part IV:  China’s Interests 
 There is little room to doubt that China has been much more accommodating to Kachin 
people in Yunnan than it has been to North Koreans, despite the more compelling case for 
finding that North Koreans in China meet the UN’s definition of a refugee and that their 
treatment in North Korea more clearly meets the definition of torture under the Torture 
Convention. Article 3 of the Refugee Convention forbids a state from discriminating on the basis 
of race, religion or country of origin when applying the provision of the Convention.
142
 
Additionally, neither group has experienced the hospitality with which China received 
Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s. It is the position of this paper that China’s behavior can be 
explained, but not justified, through an analysis of its economic and geopolitical interests in each 
region. In light of China’s unbending approach to North Korean refugees, the government’s 
somewhat relaxed dealings with displaced Kachin people coming into Yunnan Province suggests 
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different priorities and interests in the southwest region. The crossing of North Koreans into 
China has received serious attention from Beijing, whereas the Kachin influx to China was 
handled by local authorities in Yunnan.
143
 This suggests that the Kachin situation is not as high 
of a priority to Beijing.
144
 If China were to decide to comply with the U.N.’s requests to 
accommodate North Koreans and Kachins, its experience with Vietnamese refugees would serve 
as a useful model of how to handle a refugee population. 
Money and Stability in Myanmar 
The current conflict in the Kachin State is not the first quarrel between Myanmar’s 
national government and ethnic minority groups that has caused refugees to flee into Chinese 
territory. Conflict between Myanmar’s government and the Kokang ethnic group resulted in 
more than 37,000 refugees to flee to Yunnan Province.
145
 China has taken a similar position with 
all the conflicts that have recently occurred near the China-Myanmar border to encourage peace 
and resolution between the parties.
146
 It is the opinion of this paper that China’s approach is due 
to its calculation that encouraging resolution, rather than solely backing the government, will 
best support its economic interests in Myanmar. Many ethnic groups that oppose the national 
government, or at least particular government actions, are well organized in Myanmar, such as 
the KIO. Supporting the national government without encouraging dialogue between the KIO 
and Myanmar’s government would not be likely to yield quick peace or stability in the region. 
China’s interests in the Kachin State are particularly important for the economy of Yunnan 
Province. Community ties are strong on the Yunnan Province-Kachin State border, as Kachins in 
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Myanmar and Jingpo people in China belong to the same ethnic minority group. Many Chinese 
nationals live on the Myanmar side of the border to conduct trade and Kachin people often cross 
into China for daily errands and business.
147
  
China has many economic investments in the northwest region of Myanmar, which it 
may not want to disrupt by harshly sending back all Kachins that have fled to China. Myanmar is 
rich in natural resources and China’s strategic position and long political friendship with the 
country present many opportunities for Chinese state-owned enterprises.
148
 For example, the 
conflict in the Kachin State has caused China to suspend the construction of a dam on the 
Irrawaddy River called Myitsone. The plan is unpopular among many people in Myanmar for 
environmental reasons and is seen by many as being exploitative of Myanmar’s resources. Over 
90% of the electricity generated by the Myitsone would have been sent to China.
149
 In order to 
proceed with building the dam, China would need to renegotiate and gain the support of several 
groups in Myanmar, including the Kachin.
150
 Another strategic Chinese investment in Myanmar 
is an oil and gas pipeline project that would provide China with more direct access to the Indian 
Ocean and therefore reduce China’s dependency on shipping oil from North Africa and the 
Middle East through the Malacca Strait.
151
 Construction of the pipelines began in 2010 and they 
are designed to transfer 22 million tons of crude oil from North Africa and the Middle East and 
an additional 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas from offshore gas fields near Myanmar.
152
 
This project will be a large energy source for China and will lessen its dependency on coal. 
Stability in Myanmar is of great importance to the success of these investments.  
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Provoking the Regime 
In a 2007 article, the New York Times suggested that if the U.S. assured China that it 
would only be a “way station” for North Koreans to relocate to other countries, Beijing’s fears of 
an influx of refugees would vanish and the situation would improve.
153
 However, this hypothesis 
assumes that avoiding a refugee population is China’s main motivation for its repatriation policy. 
Of course, its own soaring population is a concern to China, but the influence of its relationship 
with the North Korean government should not be ignored or understated. In regard to China’s 
interests in maintaining its repatriation policy toward North Koreans, Zhu Feng, a national 
security expert and professor at the prestigious Peking University in Beijing, commented that, 
“The problem is that if China refuses to repatriate, that would signal that Beijing wants to bring 
down the North Korean regime.”154 In 1986, China entered into an agreement with North Korea 
to prevent illegal border crossings called the Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of 
Maintaining National Security and Social Order and the Border Areas.
155
 China claims that this 
bilateral agreement with North Korea supersedes any obligation it has under an international 
treaties.
156
  
There could be many reasons why China prefers to maintain its status quo relationship 
with North Korea. Although during the time of Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong, China and North 
Korea shared many similar political and ideological values, today, even the Chinese government 
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appears to view North Korea as a loose cannon that must be contained.
157
 While sharing a border, 
it serves Chinese interests of peace and stability in the region to avoid provoking its 
unpredictable neighbor. After North Korea conducted nuclear and missile tests in February 2013, 
China began to take a stronger hand in enforcing UN sanctions.
158
 Inspection of cargo headed to 
North Korea has become more rigorous in Chinese ports and cities.
159
 Other than this small 
improvement, China’s approach to North Korea does not seem to be changing, even though the 
relationship does not appear to be symbiotic in anyway. North Korea repeatedly ignores China’s 
advice not to threaten the United States, South Korea, or Japan with nuclear weapons.
160
 The 
Chinese government provides a significant amount of food, fuel, and funding to North Korea, but 
the regime has little to offer China in return. It appears that North Korea is like an unpredictable 
friend that China perpetually placates, while in the meantime, conducting diplomatic damage-
control each time North Korea makes a nuclear threat. It is the opinion of the paper that China 
continues its repatriation of North Korean refugees, in part, for the same reasons it participates in 
every other song and dance with the North Korean regime— that provoking the leadership or 
destabilizing the North Korean economy could result in the next world war right on China’s 
border and/or a flood of refugees into Chinese territory. If North Korea were to collapse, China 
fears and political analysts predict that it would result in South Korea’s leadership over the entire 
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peninsula, which is counter to China’s interests because it would mean that their immediate 
neighbor is a nuclear-armed U.S. ally.
161
 
Part V:  Looking Forward 
The UNHCR has already requested China to accept displaced Kachins from Myanmar 
and allow them to obtain a temporary legal status in China until they are able to safely return to 
their villages. These requests were made recently and there have been no public reports 
evidencing China’s compliance. Still, the Chinese government is probably less concerned about a 
huge influx of Kachins entering Yunnan Province than it is about the high number of North 
Koreans that would enter into China if North Korea were to collapse. Also, China’s previous 
accommodation of Kachins in IDP camps may indicate at least a possibility of willingness to be 
cooperative. Authorities in Yunnan sent back groups of Kachins and this received international 
attention. Over the span of decades, Kachin people have clung onto and fought for their 
autonomy and representation in the government of Myanmar. History indicates they are a group 
of people that are proud of and attached to the region they call home. It appears the Kachin 
people are not seeking to permanently relocate to China and the UNHCR has noted that it is 
preparing for voluntary repatriation of these refugees. However, many are currently still fearful 
of returning to their villages. Taking these factors into consideration, it would behoove China to 
continue to accept displaced Kachins and grant them temporary status, as requested by the 
UNHCR. Reducing the volume of people in Myanmar’s internally displaced persons camps 
would protect more Kachin civilians and might help to facilitate resolution of the conflict. Peace 
between the KIA and the Myanmar government is essential to the continuation of Chinese 
energy projects in the region, as is the support of the Kachin Independence Organization. 
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Turning away displaced Kachins is not likely to help the Chinese resume construction of the 
Myitsone Dam and might even cause the amount of Chinese dollars already invested to be 
wasted if the project is permanently suspended.  
China’s struggle with North Koreans fleeing famine and the persecution of their 
government has persisted for over two decades. During this time, China has consistently returned 
discovered refugees to North Korea, as per its agreement with the North Korean government. 
There are some issues, such as limiting North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons, which behoove 
China to take a strong position with the North Korean government. However, given China’s own 
record, remedying human rights violations has not been at the top of Beijing’s agenda with its 
eastern neighbor. Along the same line, given the increasing severity of North Korea’s statements 
of nuclear threat toward South Korea and the United States, the international community’s 
priority of putting pressure on China to use its influence to contain these threats is probably 
much greater than the current concern of China’s repatriation of North Korean refugees.162 The 
United Nations is, however, taking forward steps to address human rights violations in North 
Korea and petition China to enforce UN sanctions. On Thursday, March 21, 2013, the UN 
formed a committee to investigate human rights in North Korea.
163
 It is the first time that such an 
inquiry has been made, but whether it will deal with China’s repatriation of North Korean 
refugees is unclear at this time.
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China’s concerns in Myanmar versus North Korea are as far apart as the regions are in 
miles. It is befitting to China’s economic interests in Myanmar to encourage resolution between 
the Kachins and Myanmar’s government. The conflict in the Kachin State is occurring between 
the KIA and the Myanmar Army, with civilian Kachin casualties. Considering the current 
domestic climate in Myanmar, China would not find success in supporting Myanmar’s national 
government to crush opposition without dialogue. North Korea on the other hand, has all power 
and force concentrated in its capital, Pyongyang. There is no visible conflict between the people 
and the North Korean government, only the regime’s unilateral abuse of the people. From a 
Chinese perspective, the current state of affairs in North Korea probably encourage China to 
support its agreements with the testy North Korean regime and use its influence in select battles. 
With the world watching both regions, lifted sanctions by western countries in Myanmar, and 
nuclear threats from the North Korean government, there is always a possibility that China will 
move closer to conforming to requests from the international community to accommodate 
Kachins and North Koreans in China. Still, human rights almost always take a second seat to 
national security and China understandably perceives a destabilizing or angered North Korea as a 
huge national and regional security issue. 
If China were to accept North Korean refugees into its territory, its strategic approach to 
dealing with the large influx of Vietnamese refugees several decades ago would serve as a useful 
model. These Vietnamese refugees were able to establish a new life in China and become 
productive members of society. The lack of shared ethnicity between the Chinese Han majority 
and North Koreans should not alone cause China to be any less welcoming of North Korean 
refugees. Despite these recommendations, China’s past approach in the two regions remains the 
best prediction of how it will continue to protect its interest in Myanmar and North Korea. As 
34 
 
current nuclear tensions in North Korea and the conflict in the Kachin State of Myanmar develop, 
the world will watch and China will have the opportunity to fulfill its obligations under its 
international treaty agreements, protect those that come to the aid of the helpless, and once again 
exhibit their ability to effectively receive a refugee population.  
